Reflections on the resource allocation strategy of the Benefit Sharing Fund : Policy Brief by Louafi, Selim
5th Session of the Governing Body of the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
Reflections on the resource 
allocation strategy of the 
Benefit Sharing Fund
Policy Brief
How shall the sharing of benefits stemming from the Benefit-sharing Fund (BSF) of the In-
ternational Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (the Treaty) be
handled? How shall the resource allocation mechanisms be designed in order to achieve
the distributional equity foreseen by the Treaty? 
Although these questions are fundamental to the overall functioning of the Treaty, it is the
resource mobilization side of the BSF that has attracted much more attention so far. This
policy paper aims to provide some preliminary reflections to initiate a discussion on the re-
source allocation strategy of the BSF of the Treaty. 
Shortcomings of the current 
approach 
In a context of limited funding, the current project level approach appears difficult to su-
stain. Wrongly or not, several limits are perceived by stakeholders involved in activities con-
cerning Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (PGRFA):
- Risks of dilution of impacts by funding a scatter of disparate local projects;
- High excludability (small probability of success) due to discrepancy between demand 
and available funds; 
- Risks of rent capture by well-established groups;
- Project-level actions are not addressing the shortcomings of the broader policy fra-
mework within which these projects are taking place and which could jeopardize the 
expected benefits.
At a more fundamental level, the rationale of re-nationalizing or re-individualizing benefits
that are supposed to be of collective nature and that were generated at the global level
can be questioned.  The project-level approach gives an adversarial logic to a framework
all built around cooperation rather than competition. In these conditions, although priority
is given to projects involving developing countries, this logic puts into competition actors
and countries that are too heterogeneous and unequally endowed. How could these short-
comings be addressed?
The BSF in its broader environ-
ment
Three features of the BSF must be taken into consideration when dealing with the resource
allocation strategy: 1) As part of the Benefit-sharing (BS) system of the Treaty, the BSF is
functionally interrelated with other BS components; 2) As part of the Multilateral System
(MLS) of the Treaty, the BSF is characterized by the global and collective nature of benefits;
3) As part of the Treaty, the BSF plays an important role in maintaining the cooperative
logic of the Treaty. These features raise three major challenges. 
The equity challenge: how to target interventions in such a way that they address the
unequal capacities of countries and actors to benefit from the Treaty? From an equity per-
spective, priority should be given to investing in non-monetary BS mechanisms. They po-
tentially have important catalytic effects that allow addressing the unequal capacities of
countries and actors to benefit from the Treaty.
The public value challenge: how to ensure impacts beyond the actors or the sectors in
which the funded activities are carried out? How can funds be used in order to serve a com-
mon (collective) interest and/or support the creation of a common (collective) good?  
The BSF, as one of the main financial mechanism of the Treaty, should play a role in gene-
rating enough incentives for actors and countries to cooperate for the provision of collective
benefits that can or are best realized at the global level (i.e. the non-monetary benefits) and
ensure that these global benefits flow to national and local levels. Activities that could best
address these challenges are classified according to the degree of cooperation among actors
(horizontal axis) and the degree of collective benefits they generate (vertical axis) (see graph 1). 
The cooperation challenge: how to best take into account the various interdependencies
in such a way that the maximum positive externalities are realized? How can funds be di-
rected towards strengthening the coordination and cooperation between stakeholders,
activities and countries? The different types of interdependencies generate multiple and
multi-directional positive externalities that have major consequences for global cooperation
on PGRFA. Maximum global impacts could be reached by taking advantage of initiatives
that spread across various locations and activities or crops. 
If cooperation is to be promoted, questions then remain on how far the BSF should go in
funding specific sectorial activities or specific crops? And to what extent should the BSF en-
gage in regional, national or even local affairs? To help answering these questions, activities
could be classified according to the degree of positive externalities they generate: from
local and specialized activities relevant to a narrow set of users and/or locations up to global
and integrated activities that have a large market, broad applicability, and spillovers across
several regions and actors (see graph 2).
Perspective: how to improve 
resource allocation?
The BSF could be used as a facilitating mechanism for increased cooperation on
PGRFA across countries, stakeholders and sectors in order to be in line with the col-
lective nature of the BSF and better manage the various interdependencies.
Based on graphs 1 and 2 above, those activities that fall into box 2 and B (Activities with
societal benefits carried out by multiple actors and Global initiatives across various PGRFA
activities) are the ones best placed to address global interdependencies on PGRFA and
serve the collective nature of the benefits. These types of activities require joint actions of
several actors across various countries. They would be global in scope rather than discri-
minating among countries and would aim to integrate several activities along the value
chain rather than focusing on only one. 
However, the emphasis on the ‘global’ and collective character must not lose sight of the
fact that the actual provision of benefits and the way they are perceived are ultimately roo-
ted in the domain of the local, i.e. in specific activities at the national and local levels. A
lack of capacity to engage in global and collective actions undermines the possibility for go-
vernments, organizations and individuals to take advantage of the benefits generated at
the global level. A difficult equilibrium has therefore to be found between global activities
and specific actions, actors or countries. 
The BSF could be specifically targeted on the enhancement of non-monetary BS
mechanisms. These mechanisms currently suffer from a shortage of resources although
they are essential to meet both public value and equity challenges: their benefits are of col-
lective nature (i.e. social benefits) and could compensate for differences in capacities. Using
the monetary benefit sharing mechanism to help realizing the non-monetary mechanisms
should improve the overall functioning of the system by initiating a positive feedback loop,
as the improvement of information exchange, technology transfer and capacity building
















































Graph 1 : Public value challenge
Graph 2 : Cooperation challenge
In summary, it is proposed to use the BSF as a facilitating mechanism for increased coope-
ration among institutions and bodies across countries for the implementation of non-mo-
netary BS mechanisms targeted at activities or crops that are more needed by vulnerable
and less endowed stakeholder groups. 
How to concretely implement such a strategy? Four options can be envisaged:
1. A competitive approach with specific conditions in relation to the scope (in 
terms of number of countries, activities or target and beneficiary groups). This sce-
nario is the closest to the current one with the main difference that equity, coope-
ration and public value challenges are integrated into the call for proposals and 
translate into mandatory requirements. 
2. A programmatic approach at regional and/or at crop network and/or at the-
matic levels. This approach would first allocate funds for the establishment of long-
term plans that would provide for an overall programmatic coherence. Once esta-
blished, funds could then be allocated to specific priorities identified in these plans.
3. An activity-driven approach whereby specific activities are targeted and 
funds are allocated on an egalitarian basis among regions or crop networks.
This scenario would only differ from the previous one by relying on an overall pro-
grammatic coherence established on a thematic/activity level at the global level (i.e. 
approved by the Governing Body). 
4. An outsourcing strategy to executing agencies that are used to work with vul-
nerable groups (e.g. IFAD). If equity is considered as a primary concern, this solution 
would allow for efficient and well-targeted interventions while ensuring that they are 
undertaken within a broader policy framework (such as the one on food security in 
the case of IFAD).
The various options proposed are not necessarily mutually exclusive and can perfectly be
combined, including within the project level approach, whether through different funding
windows (different options available at the same time) or in a sequential way (one option
after another). 
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